
Against a backdrop of a highly divisive decision for the UK to leave the European Union (better known by the ghastly word “Brexit”), British Prime Minister Theresa May has called a snap general election for 8 June.
It's extraordinary how far Theresa May will go to avoid having to be at that state dinner with Donald Trump…
— Graham Cluley ???????? (@gcluley) April 18, 2017
I’m not going to get into my views as to whether the UK should leave Europe or not (you can read my Twitter account if you want to know my feelings about that), but here’s some important piece of advice for anyone working for a political party on its election campaign:
Think before you click
As we saw during the US election campaign, those working on election campaigns can be remarkably lax when it comes to their online security – reusing weak passwords between different sites, being duped by phishing emails, having their social media accounts hijacked and – most damagingly – having their private email conversations and documents stolen and leaked to the media.
It’s probably unfair to focus on one particular individual’s security snafu that may have influenced the US election, but hey… it seems clear that the hack of Hillary Clinton’s campaign chief John Podesta was enormously damaging, and made things easier for the Trump team.
This is the bogus email that Podesta received from a cybercriminal gang hell-bent on cracking into his webmail account.

If you’re campaigning in the UK election, don’t be a Podesta.
Whatever political party you are fighting for, ensure that you’re careful to use strong, unique passwords, that you have enabled two-step verification on your online accounts where possible, that you are always cautious about clicking on links and unsolicited email attachments, and wary of entering your passwords on sites that may be attempting to phish you.
Check out our recent “Smashing Security” podcast for more tips on securing webmail accounts to prevent your private emails making the headline, and perhaps derailing your campaign.
Show full transcript ▼
This transcript was generated automatically, probably contains mistakes, and has not been manually verified.
To give people greater insight into emerging threats. What's really going on out there?
So you can either sign up to be one of their customers, obviously, or you can get their free cyber daily newsletter and get the latest insights in your inbox at no charge whatsoever.
All you have to do is go to recordedfuture.com/intel.
I'm joined today by Carole Theriault. Hello, Carole.
Not everything to do with security is important to everyone, but this one I reckon is important because everyone's got an email address, haven't they?
But I just like it because I don't have to, it's like, I have to be there. You ask me a question, if I'm not there, I can't answer in half an hour, there's no point.
With email, I get that chance to reply later.
So I'm sort of like, sure, I'm going to carry on using email. Works fine for me. Now, most people are using, I would argue, webmail.
They have some sort of web interface for accessing the mail. And of course, there are the big webmail services, the Gmail, the Outlook, Yahoo, you know, these great big giants.
And that's probably where the majority of people have got their email. Right now, there are third parties as well.
So what I thought we'd do today is we'd look at how we can better protect our webmail accounts.
Now, what techniques can listeners use to make sure that their accounts don't get hacked and their information isn't stolen? Because obviously that could be damaging to us.
You know, there's so many different things that they have to think about.
So if we can kind of go through the main things they can do, they'll be much, much safer if they can actually turn these things on and configure it properly.
And of course, even if you're one of the post-email crowd, well, I haven't met anyone who doesn't have an email address, and I haven't met anybody who doesn't want to speak to me by email if they don't find me on Twitter.
And of course, lots of people, if they've got the Twitters and the Facebooks and all the other social media services, probably have and need an email address that they rely on for the security of all those other accounts, because they probably use it for password recovery in emergencies.
Yeah, that's such a good—
They don't use it for day-to-day communication, but absolutely it's a fundamental requirement for lots of, you know, accounts that you have to open. So it's there, recovery email.
Good point.
Because your email account, of course, could be the thing which helps them unlock so many other accounts that you have online.
For example, your bank might be willing to send you an email saying there's something going on. You might have to log into their account.
They won't put the details in the email, but they'll send that by email. They won't send you a tweet with that information in.
The same with in many countries with the tax office and so forth.
So there are occasions where you're going to rely on email as your primary vehicle of communicating, maybe with state institutions and other services which relate to your finances, even if you don't use it day by day.
So you're right, it's sort of double plus important.
It's a complete nightmare for her. That was her only place where she had all those details.
And they did that so that she couldn't go out and warn everyone of the hack because they were trying to collect money.
They were saying she was in Malaysia and in dire need of money and just send it to this account, I think.
Because for a long time, we've accepted emails back and forth almost at a contractual level, haven't we?
And I think probably the first and most obvious tip which we can give people on how to protect their webmail better is to choose a stronger unique password.
But it's so important, particularly if you're webmail, that it's a unique password.
What we've seen happen time and time again are data breaches occur where the hackers will grab your username and password, and often your username will be your email address, of course, from the site which has been hacked.
And then they will apply that password which they've grabbed to your actual email account, and they will be able to use that to unlock your email account.
And because, as we've discussed, your email account is really the center, it's the heart of your online identity, so much more can then unravel.
So you've got to choose a stronger unique password.
They know they shouldn't use Flopsy as a password, so they imagine Flopsy99 is okay instead.
All the password cracking tools know to do that, in the same way that using leet speak, you know, where you put 3 instead of E and 1 instead of I or L.
Well, that makes it a bit longer for password cracking, but all password cracking tools I've seen just treat, you know, A and 4 or E and 3 as effectively interchangeable in their cracking.
So that really doesn't buy you much at all.
I think my preference would probably be for most people with something as important as your webmail account, use a password manager to generate a long, complicated password for you.
And that will have the benefit that it will also remember it and store it in a secure fashion so that you don't have to memorize it yourself.
You don't have to worry that you're going to forget it. You won't have to write it down on a piece of paper. The password manager is storing it.
And this has one big advantage when it comes to phishing, which is another way in which criminals can try and break into your account, is they trick you into entering your account details on a fake bogus site pretending to be the login page for Yahoo or the login page for Google.
And a password manager should hopefully not be able to identify that as the legitimate Gmail login page or the legitimate Yahoo login page, and so it won't offer to enter the credentials for you.
So that's a great way to protect against some of these phishing attacks. Use a password manager not just to generate the password, but also to help prevent phishing.
And the answer to that is, if you cross that bridge, if you decide you're going to put all your eggs in one basket, I've mixed a metaphor there, then, you know, lock that basket really, really carefully.
At least you only have to do it once. You can have one complicated password. Once you get used to it, you should be able to type it in fairly quickly.
And remember the idea of passwords, they're not meant to be a tiny little speed bump like those ones with the gaps where cars can kind of go past them without going over.
It's meant to slow you down. It's meant to make you stop, think, consider.
And the fact that it is inconvenient and it takes a bit of time, and I'm sure we're going to get on to two-factor authentication in a minute, which, you know, is another side of the same coin.
It's not meant to be completely easy to put in that master password.
It's kind of like, you know, having a lock on your front door that doesn't just open because you happen to tap it.
Many webmail services are now offering this feature as an additional layer of security.
Effectively, what this means is that even if a hacker does manage to grab your password, when they log in, when they try and break into your account, they should be stopped.
There should be a message which comes up and says, "Oi, hang on a moment, we don't recognize this computer or where you're coming from.
Can you enter your 6-digit number which we've just sent to your authenticator app or whatever the gizmo is that's receiving that number as an additional verification?" And I think we'd all recommend that people turn that on, right?
So I use it wherever I can.
And then after a while, you watch somebody logging in and they don't reach for their phone or they don't check for some secondary factor.
Typically, they're either SMSs or something that comes up on an app, which importantly is different every time.
So if a crook phishes it, he gets one and only one go at your account. And when I see people logging in like that, I think, golly, they seem to be taking a bit of a chance.
It's like, that's much too easy. And, you know, once you get used to it, I mean, I've heard all sorts of excuses why people don't want it.
Oh, well, I don't like the SMS-based one because, you know, I might not have my phone with me.
Well, if you don't have your phone with you, you're not going to be able to use the authenticator app either.
Maybe you're probably not going to be on the internet if your phone's your access point.
Or people say, oh, well, the SMS, it's not that secure because someone could port my SIM or swap my SIM and then they'd get the message.
And so that's a reason for not having any second factor at all. I don't quite buy that.
I think anything you can do, particularly when that second factor is essentially a password that's different every time, that greatly reduces the risk that someone can get your password today and then drain your account or attack your mail for months afterwards.
Many of the webmail services these days will give you the option of saying, look, only be reminded, only be asked this question maybe once every 30 days.
So what you will have is a trusted browser on your particular computer and it remembers, okay, this computer is allowed to log into the webmail.
But if someone tries to log in from Venezuela or somewhere like that, then they will be prompted for this verification code.
So you can get rid of some— a little bit of the pain if you do find that irritating, but you still get all that security.
It's not that onerous when you think what a crook can do with your life if they get your email password. They can mess things up.
And I wonder if that's a stepping stone, is just giving them that extra little bit of comfort so they only have to do it once a month.
That's got to be better than not doing it at all. You know, we've seen this complaint with other technology, and I think people should consider this.
I mean, certainly people recognize when they're moving money from their bank accounts, when they're transferring cash, that if they're sending it to somebody new, most banks these days will ask you to go through this verification process, this two-factor process.
And I think people, they think, oh, it's a bit of a pain. But you remember, that is protecting your bank account.
Well, your web email is really equivalent in many ways to your bank account. It's that important to your online life.
And I haven't found a way really to convince them because they just say, oh, you're just spreading fear and doubt.
You're just spreading— you're just, you know, exaggerating the problem. And I find it really hard to communicate how important it is, 2FA, multifactor authentication.
But they go, oh, I don't want to give, you know, Facebook or Twitter or whoever it is my phone number because they'll just start spamming me.
Well, I suppose there is that risk, but in my experience, those bigger social networking companies and webmail companies, they have been pretty straightforward about when they take your mobile phone number to use it to help you with security and when they take it so they can send you stuff.
And I don't think the better services really mix them up.
So should you forget your account details, should you be locked out for any reason, you have some method for your webmail provider to contact you and give you some mechanism for getting back in.
Of course, that's the thing that people forget.
They go, oh, I just need this account, I'll hardly ever use it, so I can— the one that's really, really, really important, I'll do less and less work on security because I won't be using it a lot.
Doesn't work like that. Once is enough.
So it's a good thing to kind of check on your important accounts to make sure the recovery information is up to date because people do change jobs.
Don't just ignore them, don't just shove them in the bin.
So yes, you need to be careful if you do receive an alert as to clicking on links, whether you're going to the real webmail service or if you're going to a phishing site.
So hey, your password manager will help a little bit there as well. And obviously be careful about any attachments.
I can't see any legitimate reason why a webmail service would be sending you an attachment when it sends you those kind of alerts.
Once you've learned how to navigate through the often Byzantine corridors of their security menus, many of them, they do have a page where you can log in yourself and then you can go to that page.
It'll say, show me what the last N accesses to my account, and you can go back and you can have a look and see if that matches you.
And they say, please note, we haven't put a login here, but we're just saying if you go to the bank site and log in in your normal way using your normal trustworthy procedures, you can find out what it is.
So they use the alert, isn't really an alert, it's kind of a notification. And then you actually go yourself in your own trusted way to the site to actually see what's going on.
And it may even be able to see someone logged in from this country, and whereas you always use a Windows computer, this person was using a Mac.
And that may ring alarm bells and you're thinking, well, hang on, I'm not in Venezuela or wherever it is in the world where these logins are occurring from, and so forth.
Well, that must be suspicious, and that can warn you that something bad is happening.
The point is, where these services are collecting this data, where you can go in and have a look at those logins, generally speaking, a crook can go in and look as well, but he can't make his own login disappear.
So if you go in there and review that on a regular basis, that means that you've got a fighting chance, even if it's a little while later.
If, you know, better to know a week later that somebody's been messing around in your email account than to find out 3 years later.
However, once they'd gained access to an account, even if the owner of the account changed their passwords, they were still able to access the emails.
And the reason for that, well, there's a couple of ways in which hackers can do that which I think people need to be aware of.
One is that you may have granted access to your account through some form of delegation.
So your webmail service may have the ability to say, "Yes, you can access your account, but would you like someone else to be able to access your account as well?" And that can be hidden away in the settings that, you know, it's the equivalent really of letting your personal assistant or someone like that go through your email.
And the problem is, as I said, that even if you change your password, it doesn't mean that they can no longer access.
The other way in which this can occur is that the hacker could have set up a rule inside your webmail to automatically forward email, and they could auto— so the email could even still appear as unread in your own inbox, but it's actually secretly been forwarded to someone else's address.
And who knows what they're going to do with it and what they plan to do with it. So you need to look for rules which are doing that.
Maybe they were after things like credit card numbers, but they don't go making fake credit cards and trying to spend them themselves.
Yeah, they just go on to some underground forum and they get information about people, arbitrary information. They just put it up for sale. Yeah, even if it's 50 cents a go.
So that's the problem. If your email is being bulk forwarded or bulk copied to somebody else, the problem is you never know what they might have done with it.
And worst of all, it might be in the third, fourth, fifth party's hands as well because it might have been traded for something else bitcoin.
Same idea, isn't it?
They may be trying to do something with your contacts.
They may be trying to make your email more manageable if you're getting too much email and trying to sort it into different folders, for instance.
And you are putting your trust in those third-party services that they are going to do a good job and that they are not going to be hacked.
But yeah, they have full access after that.
And I haven't recently met a person who hasn't said to me, are you crazy? You use Twitter through its website?
You don't use some third-party app that lets you keep on top of all of this? So I'm in a minority, a tiny minority. Yeah.
So I'd say that most people probably have in one of their important online digital life services delegation to somebody else to act on their behalf, whether that's reading email, sending email, reading tweets, sending texts, posting to Facebook, whatever.
No one ever does, but this— and that's my buddy. Why wouldn't you believe it? It has that ring of personal truth.
One is don't leave loads of old incriminating email with lots of sensitive stuff you no longer need lurking in your webmail account.
If you have no longer a purpose for it— and I understand some things do need to be kept for a long time— maybe it makes sense to erase it.
Of course, we are given almost limitless amounts of storage these days with some of these webmail services, but it may make sense to delete it.
Your friends, your colleagues, your family, because of course if you're exchanging private sensitive emails with those people, which you probably are, then you can have battened down all the hatches, you can have all the security in the world, but if they've been sloppy about their security, it's still your information which is ending up in the hands of criminals.
So do your little bit to spread the word about how to better protect accounts, because you can do a little bit of good that way.
And, you know, that's the big trick with CEO fraud, which is hitting businesses small, medium, and large all over where someone emails and it actually really is your CEO.
It's your CEO's account emailing or your CFO's account, but it's not them. But it doesn't have all those telltale signs that a spam or a scam would have maybe 10 years ago.
It's all written in exactly conversational English that your CFO would normally use because the crook went back a few months and picked a very similar email that the person wrote last time.
So when you're leaving your history behind, you're also— that's gold dust to social engineers because it's free fodder for how you communicate and the kind of words you're likely to use.
So using your computer at your home, providing you have an up-to-date antivirus and you've kept it patched and so forth, may well be considered more secure than using a publicly shared computer.
So be careful where you log in because there may be malware in the background, but also make sure you log out.
Don't leave yourself logged in because the next person to use that computer may find it all too easy to gain access to your account.
My advice for internet cafes, you know, obviously with the modern mobile phone era, they're less well used, but sometimes you need one, is if you go into an internet cafe and you're sitting down at their console and you get to the point where you're about to log in to your webmail and you think, I wonder if this is secure, the answer is it is not.
Turn around and leave.
You don't know where that jolly thing has been, or who has used it before, or who's got access to the cheap lock on the little wooden door that leads— could have let them put in a USB key.
For goodness' sake, if banks can have trouble with people modifying the software on their ATM so it'll disgorge money without coming from an account, then how much less secure do you think an internet cafe's computer is going to be?
If you have enjoyed the show, subscribe to us on iTunes and leave a review. We're also on Google Play Music, Stitcher, TuneIn, Overcast, and other podcast apps.

Thanks for this Graham, I do wonder why their is radio silence regarding the hacking of the postal vote website? There has been a large amount of electoral postal fraud over the years, and not much commentary on it. I'm very curious to understand how we are protected, were there no forensics on the matter, the US government and law enforcement are a lot more transparent than our own, if you reflect on the past 6 months. I bet there were not, cyber security in England is always seen as secondary until something bad happens. I would ask, were there intrusion detection systems? were those logs monitored in real-time through a SOC? I doubt it very much. It will be classed as SECRET and no one can whistle-blow; as the Official Secrets Act does not protect Whistle-blowers. All speculation of course. I would ask though, that if PCI-DSS for the banks is good enough to protect our money, why is there no equivalent for Government systems. The Ritz balcony case law (think ISO 27001 as well as prescriptive good practices from PCI) for standards would be an interesting comparison in this case, possibly.
Decided to invest in a ETF which invests in cybersecurity.