
UK security company Keepnet Labs has publicly confirmed that a database it had collated containing more than five billion records from past data breaches was “briefly exposed” on the internet.
If you think you’ve heard about this before, you’re right.
I first reported on the security breach back in March, following the initial discovery of the exposed data – which could be accessed without a password or any authentication – by security researcher Bob Diachenko.
Now, if I was a security firm which found itself embroiled in an embarrassing breach like this I think I would be keen to be transparent about what had occurred, and share what I had done to ensure that similar problems did not occur again.
Honesty, after all, is the best policy – and by apologising and behaving openly you can actually build trust inside this crazy industry of ours.
But Keepnet Labs didn’t do that. Instead, it contacted media outlets requesting that their name be removed from the news reports.
It even contacted people who had simply been quoted in the news reports (individuals who didn’t even name Keepnet Labs in the quote they offered journalists) and threatened them with legal action unless they somehow withdrew their comment.
Crazy stuff.
I was one of the blogs that Keepnet Labs contacted.
But as far as I could see, I hadn’t made any mistakes in my article.
I gave Keepnet Labs multiple opportunities to tell me what was incorrect in my article, or to offer me a public statement that I could include in the article. I told them I was keen to present the facts accurately.
Here’s part of one email I sent Keepnet Labs:
I continue to offer you a right of reply on my website. I am happy to include an update on the existing article containing a statement from your company, refuting the claim (if you wish) and (if you wish) clarifying what actually happened. I’m sure this would be a big reassurance for your customers and potential future customers.
I could quote from our email exchanges – indeed I could have done this weeks ago – if you are uncomfortable crafting a formal statement, but I’m not keen on quoting private correspondence without the permission of the other party.
Do please let me know how you would like to proceed so we can close this matter as quickly as possible. I’m confident that a brief statement from KeepNet Labs republished on my site could resolve this issue by the end of the day!
But Keepnet Labs didn’t want to offer a statement, or talk publicly about what happened.
Instead, earlier this month, Keepnet Labs threatened me with legal action for publishing an article naming them in relation to the security breach, and demanded I removed their name from the article.

One of the oddities of this letter is that they say the offending statement is:
“Keepnet Labs Breached Customer Data or 5B+ records”
However, these are words that never appeared in my article. To be clear (and I’m sure you could use the Wayback machine if you wanted to check), at no point did I claim that Keepnet Labs customers had been impacted by the security breach.
Anyway, after weeks of failing to get any co-operation from Keepnet Labs about what actually happened, and unwilling to enter a time-wasting legal tussle, I decided to remove their name from my article.
I announced on Twitter that the article had been updated and why, although I was careful not to mention Keepnet Labs.
Following a legal threat from ███████ ████ I have removed their name from this article on my site:https://t.co/kQOzgzoVHa
I hope readers will accept my apologies for what is clearly unsatisfactory, but I can ill-afford to get embroiled in a legal fight. pic.twitter.com/zcIkqirwb9
— Graham Cluley ???????? (@gcluley) June 3, 2020
What’s news now is that Keepnet Labs – sorry, ███████ ████ – has issued a public statement about the security breach which occurred two months ago.
I suspect Keepnet Labs only issued its statement because of the dogged determination of Rob Scammell, deputy editor of Verdict, and the army of Twitter users who responded to my tweet by using their ingenuity to uncover who the company was that had gagged me.
In its newly-published public statement, Keepnet Labs says it “accepts full accountability for this incident” but blames it on an unnamed third-party service provider to which it had outsourced the database management.
Keepnet Labs is also keen to underline that none of its customer data was exposed. The exposed data was data collected from past security breaches.
Which is, of course, what I said in my article.
Just to be clear, and for the record, I welcome Keepnet Labs publishing a public statement about the data exposure. I think that’s a good thing they have done.
They should, of course, have done it back in March rather than waiting for June. Taking so long to make a statement and trying to get your name removed from news articles isn’t a good look. Especially for a security firm.
Security firms should be examples for all businesses on how to behave after a security breach. Transparency, disclosure of what went wrong, and what steps are being taken to ensure that something similar doesn’t happen again are key to building trust and confidence from customers and the rest of the industry.
Disclosures of failure can be painful, but they ultimately are less embarrassing and damaging than cover-ups. Most of us in the industry accept that accidents can happen, and mistakes can occur. We should own up to our mistakes in a prompt fashion and lead by example.
Keepnet Labs would have done well to publish its statement at the time the breach was disclosed and work with the news agencies and bloggers to give their side of the story rather than against them.
Keepnet Labs’s failure to to respond in a timely and transparent fashion, and their attempt to remove themselves from the story, made this a much bigger deal than it ever would have been otherwise.
To hear more about what happened, check out this episode of the “Smashing Security” podcast.
Show full transcript ▼
This transcript was generated automatically, probably contains mistakes, and has not been manually verified.
Hello, hello, and welcome to Smashing Security episode 182. My name is Graham Cluley.
It's Host Unknown's sole founder, Thom Langford. Hello, Thom.
I listened a couple of weeks ago and you said something about having guests on who are less security-minded and, you know, don't have any expertise in security.
And lo and behold, here I am.
And there've been a fair few mentions of Carole and myself on the podcast. Although you seem to refer to it as Graham's podcast.
Now stay tuned at the end of the show for a special feature interview with Robert O'Brien of MetaCompliance.
Not only does he share some great info on onboarding staff into better cyber awareness, but he has quite the dreamy voice. He does, let me tell you. ROBERT O'BRIEN. Hello.
And I'm looking into how we can make it harder for credit card hackers to dupe us. All this and much more coming up on this episode of Smashing Security.
I want you to imagine this scenario. Imagine that you personally suffered a security breach. Okay? You leaked data in some way. What would you do?
This is when I still had a manual leap over the desk and almost ripped the machine off the desk.
Make sure you don't do it."
What's your recommendation? Thom, I guess it's still transparency and honesty.
I hope you wouldn't send in the lawyers.
I wrote about this UK security vendor who I'll probably bleep out, actually. I'll probably redact them from the podcast, but the name is Keeplabs. I wrote about them.
Bob Diachenko, who's an extraordinary security researcher, he's always uncovering massive databases that have been left exposed online, unprotected with even the simplest password.
He came across a database containing more than 5 billion, with a B-B-B-B, records.
I imagine they were collecting data about past data breaches, but they then accidentally exposed it in some fashion. Right. So I wrote about them and I named the company.
And what I noticed over time was that that company's name, which had been reported in other places on the internet, began to disappear mysteriously.
Suddenly no one was naming the company. And then I received an email from this company saying, "Ah, hello.
Can you please update your article to remove our name from it because it's inaccurate and it's bad for our image?" You know, Graham, this is not the only time this happened last week.
Oh, really?
And they were unable to answer any questions I might have regarding the editor and the writers being made redundant.
Because I would love to fix it. I don't want to have inaccurate information up there. And they said, well, none of our customers were involved in the data breach.
And so I said, well, I didn't say any of your customers were involved in the data breach, so I haven't got any words to fix about that.
And they said, well, it wasn't really a breach because this was data which had already been breached.
And I said, well, I think that's still a security breach because people can find it that didn't have access to it before.
Yeah, you facilitated potentially— who knows if it actually happened or not, but potentially other people may have been able to access that data because you handled it.
Carelessly in some fashion.
And I said, well, that's fine, but you know, if you've got something to say, please let me know and I will put it up on the thing.
Or if you've got any refutation or any statements you'd like to officially make, I will post it up on my article so that you can have your position. And they didn't want to do that.
They didn't want to give me any statements whatsoever.
But what they did do is they said, oh, and by the way, maybe you'd like to work with us on some business opportunities in future.
Before we discuss any other sort of business.
Next thing I knew, I got a letter from their lawyers telling me to take down their name and redact it and saying it was bad for their company and all the rest of it.
Now, I believe I haven't said anything inaccurate in that blog post, right? And I've given them a chance to have their say as well.
But what I didn't want was I didn't want to get bogged down in lots of legal arguments and letters where only the lawyers are going to get rich.
And this could go on for months and months and months. And who frankly gives a damn about it.
And in fact, what I did was I redacted their name, so I replaced it with black blobs.
And I said, you know, I apologize to readers, but, you know, I can't afford to get into a legal fight.
Now, that did have an unforeseen consequence which I couldn't possibly have imagined would happen.
There were people on Twitter who were able to determine what the company's name was.
In fact, apparently over 100,000 people saw the tweet and it was— there were lots and lots of comments on it.
I haven't commented on my tweet or anyone else's comments regarding it or liked—
I do know that Javad Malik of the Host Unknown podcast, because he spoke about it on his latest episode, folded like a pack of cards. He was contacted. He hadn't written about it.
He actually used the term breach because let's face it, nowadays it's kind of a generic term, really, a bit of a catch-all for anything that's been lost or not secured or whatever.
He mentioned that, and this particular company in question reached out to him and said, take your comments down. To which, you know, Javad said, I can't, it's not my article.
I suggest you contact the publisher, the owner of the article. And he also said, you know, as a courtesy, I have contacted them to ask them to review it, but I can't do anything.
And then they basically then came back threatening legal action, at which point he said, speak to my lawyers, and left it at that.
And how is it used? That's the only—
What it is, is putting it out there again in another easy-to-find format on the plain, regular internet. So that even more people can get access to it.
Done.
It was an Elasticsearch database, I believe, which ships and installs with everything security-wise switched off, as I understand it.
And we get it as security professionals, we get it. You know, switching security on is difficult because it limits functionality. It can slow things down in some cases.
You know, it's difficult. But if you are a security company, you need to have your shit together.
You've got to, you know, you've got to have these processes in place that make sure that anything that faces the internet or anything that contains personal or confidential information needs to go through a hardening script of some kind, be it automatic or manual.
And if it doesn't work for some reason and you get found out, then tell us why it didn't work and what you should have done so that we can all learn from it.
I think transparency, honesty, prompt response to these kind of incidents means that, you know, when something bad happens, it doesn't have to be as big a deal as you can make it by responding badly.
And we know this because, you know, many of us in security roles have experienced this when other companies register domain names that are either very close to your company name or they are the same but with a different, you know, .com or .co.uk at the end and start impersonating you.
And this is a big deal. And as a result, there's a whole sort of almost a sub-industry of, you know, brand management.
And when you register a domain, it will— you can automatically get similar domain names registered.
There are services that search out to see if there are domain names that are registered with you know, Cyrillic alphabet characters, but still looking like your domain, et cetera.
So the US a couple of years ago, or Mr. Trump, announced Space Force, the fifth wing of the US military.
He's just sitting in the background, "Oh, I want to get the laser guns." I don't know, but bottom line is he watched Moonraker, James Bond's Moonraker, and decided that's for him.
So they've yet to get involved in any kind of serious operations. They've yet to launch anything. They've kind of just been bubbling under.
They're probably still deciding what sort of camouflage they should have on their uniforms.
But it just strikes me that it doesn't matter how big your organisation is or how well-funded it is.
And let's face it, the US government has got to be kind of up there, size, complexity, and amount of characters.
But yeah, I just find it amazing that such basics like this, it's a bit like when you hear that somebody forgot to renew their certificates for their domains and stuff like that.
I find it just stunning that such basic stuff is not being done. I would imagine US Army is probably trademarked or copyrighted or something.
Which I'm— because I'm looking at—
In fact, I have someone else in my household who does most of the shopping, so I think they may have a credit card, but I don't.
I'm trying to explain it to the listeners too, Graham. It's a radio show, right? So it's not just about your knowledge.
Sometimes you have to pretend you don't know stuff to make it fun.
But with a creditor, you share responsibility and you can say, you can sometimes claw money back from it from your creditor if you can prove it wasn't your fault.
So always purchase a credit card.
I have peppered my story with a few jokes, which I got off the internet while looking for credit card jokes. Okay? And that is how we're gonna keep this light.
People are setting up new online accounts, registering their credit card details with them willy-nilly because guess what?
They can't go to the bank and they can't go to the stores to buy the things that they require.
But others who are in the eye of the storm, you know, maybe jobless, or, you know, they're out protesting unbelievable injustices, or they're, you know, and they're staving off the bills with credit card payments.
Okay, joke time, right?
Online shopping is up, and April saw a 200% jump in new mobile banking registrations, and mobile banking traffic rose 85%.
And we're not surprised by that because people are locked at home.
So since the corona shutdown, the US economy, Fidelity National Information Services, they're a fraud monitoring services for banks, have seen a huge jump in credit card scams.
That's how bad the numbers are.
So phishing, phone, SMS scams, the whole nine yards.
And one pundit said, while your day job may have gone up in smoke or become way more difficult, the hackers' day jobs just got a whole lot easier.
So you might get an SMS or an email that says, hey, free Netflix for a month or 3 months or 6 months.
Now, the reason this is hard for people to spot is because Netflix and other service video companies are offering incentives to get more users.
Oh yeah, there's loads of people that have filed for legitimate stimulus checks coming in from the government.
So what if you get a phone call or an email, someone purporting to be a bank or government official, right, saying we need to get some more information to make sure you get your check, or we just want to double-check your postal address, we get the check in the mail for you.
Ironically, I saw on Twitter that people are mistaking their stimulus checks for junk mail or a scam because I don't know if you've seen what it looks like.
And it also has Donald—
I am getting legitimate text messages from my bank saying, "Hey, we're gonna freeze your interest that you owe us during this period."
You know, don't click here, please.
If the communication includes a link, many people will use the link in the communication or told to them down the phone rather than finding out what the real link is.
Instead, work out what the real link is and go to it directly on your computer.
One guy on Twitter was saying that he keeps getting calls, and the way they start the call off is, 'Credit card services, how are you doing?' And then they offer to lower your credit card interest.
So of course, many of us had plans for the summer, like perhaps we are renting a vacation home or going on a flight or doing something with the family, and some of us have had trouble getting money back from those things.
Emails saying, "Here's your Airbnb cancellation. We just need your banking details to refund your card," could also work pretty well. Okay, it's getting bleak.
You need a joke, don't you?
Now before I get into advice, the reason I wanted to bring this up today is because you guys are both smart and you will have better advice than the advice that is given on the official FBI credit card fraud site.
So every time your bank number or credit card is used for a purchase, you get a secondary notification that tells you, hey, your card has just been used.
I know it makes everything a little bit faster, but actually it's much safer not to save it with a bunch of different companies out there.
And you can also use things like either PayPal or Apple Pay or Google Pay.
These might be a smarter way to be able to manage your money because then you have a kind of an account you can manage.
That's a great idea. I've also heard some people use, are they called virtual credit cards? What's the name of these things? Do you know about these, Thom?
So you get either a virtual credit card, which is you've got your regular card, but then your app will generate a virtual card, so you don't actually get a physical card, and you can use that for all your purchases, say, at Amazon or John Lewis or wherever.
And if something happens to that card, you can just delete that card. You don't have to apply for a new card because you've obviously still got your credit card.
But you can also get disposable cards as well, which are good for one shot. So you create a card, use that number for your purchase, and then that card is immediately destroyed.
And this way, you follow the rules and at the end it just goes poof and they can't hold you for money.
I don't know if this will work or not, but this one guy called Deldy on Twitter said he's been getting way more scam calls recently, so he's been opening with the line, "Hi, I was actually wondering if I can share my Social Security number and credit card info before we move any further." And apparently they instantly hang up.
So anyone who's inundated with calls, try that one.
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Grab a free copy of the Cybersecurity Awareness for Dummies book from MetaCompliance now. More at smashingsecurity.com/cyberaware.
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Could be a funny story, a book that they've read, a TV show, a movie, a record, a podcast, a website, or an app. Whatever they wish. Doesn't have to be security related necessarily.
He is the inventor of the Iain Knot, which he claims is the world's fastest way of tying your shoelaces. He also has an app for Android and iOS.
If you want to learn over 60 different ways of lacing your shoes, then his app is the one that you want.
Now, this is an extraordinary website all about shoelaces and how to tie your shoes, which is incredible.
What I find particularly astonishing is that Iain admits he doesn't actually give a shit about shoelaces, but he wanted to be the best at something and produce some corner of the internet, which has been there.
And that's what he's done. He's built this. His website gets over 9,000 visits per day, which is quite a lot when you consider it's all about shoelaces.
I would call on to our more avid listeners to see if they remember which episode that came out of, because I don't remember.
Just a little bit.
And what it does is it allows you to very quickly and easily resize your windows.
Now, you might think that's not very useful, but you can drag a window to the top left-hand corner and it will automatically size it to a quarter of the size of the window.
You can drag it to the left and it will be half of the window. You can drag it to the very top, it'll be the whole page.
And there's also lots of keyboard shortcuts that allow you to pick it for an eighth or for a third or different locations, etc.
And in this age of very high-resolution monitors and all that sort of thing, and I've got, you know, two 5K monitors in front of me now, I can actually end up with 8 different windows of apps open at any one time, all nicely positioned.
So some are vertical, so, you know, Twitter and Signal, etc. Some are vertical quarters because they scroll up and down. Others are, you know, regular quarters.
So yeah, I was going to choose that as my pick of the week, but instead I thought I would, in a last-minute fit of ego, I thought I'd mention the Host Unknown podcast, which I think everybody really should be listening to.
So, there's— the central character is Lily. She's played by Sonoya Mizuno. She's played in other of Garland's films and works. Basically, she works at a kind of Google-like complex.
Her boyfriend works there too. He goes missing. Oh my God, yes! Did you watch it?
They tease you, drip feeding you a little bit of information of what's going on in there.
Plus, they have the coolest statue ever in the kind of campus, which I just think we should litter the entire planet with them as a reminder of what kind of future we want to build.
So, I say watch it. I watched the entire thing in two nights. Loved it, loved it, loved it. Geeky, dark, beautiful, smart. Well acted.
What's the best way for folks to do that?
And don't forget, if you want to make sure never to miss another episode, subscribe in your favorite podcast app such as Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or Pocket Casts.
And why not leave us a nice review as well? I always love reading those.
And don't forget, stay tuned after the show for our special interview with Robert O'Brien of MetaCompliance with the smooth voice.
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Because that's how you test— I don't know if people know that, but that's how you test an accent to see if it does anything to your knees or not.
Get the person to say palimpsest, and if your knees kind of go a little bit weak, you are a sucker for that accent.
So we have a very special guest, a new guest, someone who hasn't been on the show before. I'd everyone to meet Robert O'Brien from MetaCompliance.
Robbie, thank you so much for coming on. ROBERT O'BRIEN. My pleasure, Carole.
I think, Carole, I've been a John the Baptist, a voice crying in the wilderness for, oh, I think about 15, 16 years.
Was really focused on the people aspect of security and data protection. And it's clearly the hardest piece of the jigsaw. People are difficult.
But unfortunately, I've become fascinated with that. And I've worked with a lot of companies who have tried to increase the vigilance of their teams.
And really, about 8 years ago, as phishing became prevalent and ransomware, this became a clear and present danger.
But I found that there wasn't any guides to how do you go about dealing with the people aspect of it. Where do you start?
And it was a surprise to me that when we engaged with organizations, one of the first questions is, well, what do you do? How do you start?
They hadn't really taken cybersecurity awareness or the culture change around security as a business as usual issue before.
And that really led me to go and write the Cybersecurity Awareness for Dummies book.
And a colleague thankfully edited out the more crazy things that I was trying to put into the book.
And it's totally focused on how a company can help get employees on board to be safer and help protect the company and themselves. Is that fair? ROBERT O'BRIEN. That's fair.
And I think we have condensed all the learnings and low-hanging fruit and approaches that we've seen organizations use to move this along and really brought it into an easy-to-use playbook.
And if you reach out to us, we can also send you a physical copy, which interestingly is an excellent way to get those Luddites within your organization to move forward where they have a physical book in front of them and they'll actually read that more than go and read a PDF.
There's some really, really good information. Maybe we can start with the idea of what motivates a hacker. ROBERT O'BRIEN.
I think that there are as many different types of hackers as there are people.
And I think that every time the human race has come up with a brand new way of commerce, there has always been piracy.
When the Americas were opened and we were transferring goods between the Old World and the New World, you had this blossoming of piracy, Pirates of the Caribbean type thing.
And hacking is no different than that. It's really a way of people gaining advantage, mainly for money. In my experience, that is the great motivator.
There are certainly other issues, political, national players. And so you find that it's a very, very complex issue.
Then we have businesses who are going about their mission involved in what they've been doing typically for a very long time.
And we have this brand new backdrop, and they find themselves really at a disadvantage. And the hacker spends months possibly thinking about the organization.
The organization wouldn't necessarily be thinking months on awareness or security.
The demands of the day, the crises of the day typically distracts them from approaching this problem in a more systemized fashion.
I remember when I used to work in the corporate land, even working in cybersecurity, in a cybersecurity company, you could still see plans always fall off for immediate reactionary job that everyone had to be all hands on deck.
So do you find that people have good intentions with awareness, but sometimes just don't do their homework or don't actually follow through? ROBERT O'BRIEN.
Cybersecurity culture change is a change management project. And I don't think there's any organization out there that hasn't seen change management projects really crash and burn.
I think everyone's history is littered with the failures of those things. And the problem is that you really require two things.
Number one, you require the leadership team to be 100% behind it and give it the resources that it needs.
And the second thing is that the organization is braced for the long term because change takes time.
And in my opinion, to move the needle substantively for cybersecurity takes at least 18 months. Possibly 2 years, because you have some real hardened attitudes to change.
And the minute that people see a wavering of the commitment from senior management, the whole thing falls apart like a game of cards.
And I find a lot of companies kind of say, oh, you can do this overnight. It's not an overnight job trying to change a culture within an organization.
And two, you're absolutely right. If you don't have absolute buy-in from the senior management team and if they are kind of cutting corners, that's not a good thing, right?
ROBERT O'BRIEN. It's not a good thing. And I also think that unfortunately, so up until now, cybersecurity doesn't make you profit. It doesn't get you revenues.
And therefore, it was seen as an IT thing. Now, interestingly, that's changing massively.
And I've seen it change really from the introduction of GDPR, where within the supplier contracts that every company uses as an engagement mechanism, you now have a couple of things that have come to the fore.
Number one, you have cybersecurity insurance. Ten years ago, that was unheard of. But now, what is the level of liability that is covered by your cybersecurity insurance?
The second thing is, where does the liability sit for GDPR? Who is responsible for a data protection failure and who takes the liability?
And the third thing then is you get a risk assessment from your potential customer and you have to fill in that risk assessment.
Now, before GDPR, that was largely a box-ticking exercise.
But now the risk assessment will be called upon to defend the decision to go with that vendor, that vendor selection as part of an overall privacy lifecycle.
And also the lawyers are heavily focused on it.
So really having high levels of cyber hygiene, high levels of being able to demonstrate your cyber credentials now becomes a competitive advantage.
Having ISO 27001 now becomes a competitive advantage.
And I think going forward, that is going to become more and more a feature of how people look at cybersecurity, the people that they deal with, but more importantly, I think will justify the spend that's needed in these type of projects.
Lots of IT teams have been culled or have had to deal with resource issues on that front, plus they're having to manage a whole new workforce working from home, and they want to keep it safe.
So obviously, you wrote this before all this happened, but did you touch upon remote working? And do you have any views on that? ROBERT O'BRIEN.
In the industry, we have seen the incidence of phishing and cyber activity just go through the roof.
And the reason for that is that people involved in cybercriminal activity love change.
They love different things happening to us as human beings so they can exploit the moves between working in an office, working from home, people not being within their social circle and things like that.
The issue is vigilance. The issue is then having messaging or having a subject on a monthly basis that you address to your audience.
So for example, a lot of our clients who take this really seriously immediately switched to secure remote working, immediately began sending out training based on the dangers of working from home, the increased levels of people trying to cajole you to do things that you wouldn't normally do in the office.
And they increased their vigilance. Those companies also continued with their simulated phishing attacks.
And then some people just killed them off altogether, saying, oh, you know, our staff are dealing with working from home, they're having a bad time, and they stopped.
Some people stopped simulated phishing.
And my view there was, well, in actual fact, that's what the hacking community is betting on you doing, betting on your change and the fact that everybody is disarranged.
And so I think the people that did continue with the phishing attacks actually increased the vigilance in this new environment, which is likely to continue in some form or fashion well beyond COVID.
So let's say I'm an IT guy and I really want to get through to my CEO, right? They're just not taking this seriously.
They've cut my budget, they've cut my resources, and I really need them to see the importance of cybersecurity.
Do you think a better approach is to go in with a bunch of stats to explain how dangerous it is out there?
Or do I want to talk more about how the company can grow and make more money and be safer, more secure? Lower risk. ROBERT O'BRIEN. I mean, I really feel for people in that situation.
Now, if someone had told me before Christmas that my entire organization would be working from home, all these controls would have been put into place, I wouldn't have believed them.
But now I am prepared to believe much more in terms of change. Change and the world that we lived in.
So getting someone to believe that we could have a cyber event that could cripple the organization, I think, is easier to believe. So I think that envelope expanding will help us.
Because of the change in environment, there's inherently a little bit more risk there until they can lock down both security and cyber awareness for home workers.
So this might be the time to say, look, the environment's changed. We need to be on top of it to make sure we're safe. I don't know. What do you think about that? ROBERT O'BRIEN.
Look, people have gone home. And we implemented one of the biggest changes in organizational working in centuries.
We did it in weeks where normally that would take months or maybe years for organization to put it into place and you would train everybody and so on and so forth.
But we flicked the switch and we got it done.
The other thing is the digital assets that the organization rely upon now exist within those homes, now exist within those firewalls within those homes and rely on people within and indeed rely on their families, not just the people that work for you, to be aware of the dangers and aware that certain things could happen.
And the only way to do that is to engage with your staff population and give them the information and give them the resources to actually make the change.
Because thinking it'll happen by osmosis is naive. It just won't.
And what has happened whilst there are many benefits from homeworking, from a security perspective, our perimeter has just morphed into something that is unrecognizable now.
At first, I was thinking this is really, really good for IT staff to understand what they're facing and how they can get their hands around all the different components.
But maybe, maybe, you know, maybe I was blindsided.
Maybe C-levels need to read this too, just to understand all the different components and the complexities that need to be understood so that they can be more sensitive when they're budgeting and dealing with IT.
ROBERT O'BRIEN. Carole, I mean, you've hit the nail on the head.
I mean, when I was writing this book, I sort of had an image in my mind of a CISO at a board meeting with a number of these books and basically handing them, physically handing them.
So, you know, I have the power of a gift. Here's a gift. And it's a Wiley book that we've all seen, The Dummies Guide.
And even if someone dips in and out of it, you've already made an impact. Because I think if you can get the C-level, the executive team on your side, you can change so much.
Because the problem I find with cybersecurity is that it isn't user-friendly. It involves implementing controls.
And people hate controls and they hate policies and they hate e-learning. So it's not a popular job.
But once you get the C-level involved, you get a tone from the top and people never focus on that. What does our organization stand for?
Do we have zero tolerance on these things or are we laissez-faire? Where do we fit?
And once the people in charge say, this is where we stand, then your initiatives are not diluted by middle management.
Someone who goes, look, don't bother with that e-learning, keep doing your jobs, get around to it whenever.
And suddenly your awareness campaign has just died because you have a manager somewhere who is just not supportive.
But if the CEO is supporting the actual initiative, you typically get people to buy into it.
Thank you very much, Carole.
That's smashingsecurity.com/cyberaware. See you next week.



Only thing is, you caved to this company instead of checking that legally you were bullet proof. It doesn't really show anything but a lack of journalistic integrity and suggests you are little more than a reposter rather than a reporter. We aren't angry just disappointed.
How is he supposed to check that he is legally bullet-proof without spending money that he doesn't want to spend? And how is this a lack of journalistic integrity? Or would you need to get your own suit in order to understand the niceties? Your comment just comes across as a poor attempt at a smear. Unless I misunderstood your offer to pay his legal fees?
Am I the only one who feels sorry for this company?
Yes they handled your callous indifference toward what is effectively a bullet to the head for their company imperfectly (just because personal gain was your motive it doesnt absolve you), but this is a far cry away from an actual breach.
You've taken a small oversight by an engineer that had no potential to cause harm and decided to profit by it at the very real expense of the owners and employees of this company.
You might as well go after archive.org for all the good you've done the world here.
NB. I've nothing to do with the sec company mentioned in this article (or any in the industry for that matter), I just know exploitation when I see it and it's all the more sickening when dressed up as a public service.
These things stick in people's minds Graham…
I hope the company in question is afforded the chance to learn from their mistake, in a way that the majority of us have in then past because thankfully the gutter press wasnt going through our bins.
Strange that people are attacking Graham's integrity and feeling sorry for a company that used legal harassment to avoid owning up to their mistake and even blamed him for saying something he did not say. Did you not read the whole part where Graham gave them multiple opportunities to correct the record and offered his site for their clarification or rebuttal? That is journalistic integrity in my book. And as far as backing down, I would say Graham's posting clearly shows that he stayed involved by identifying the poor manner in which the company handled the situation and had even offered them good advice on how to handle it. Instead KeepNet chose a different, confrontational approach. That was their choice and they deserve to be called out for it.
"Instead KeepNet chose a different, confrontational approach. That was their choice and they deserve to be called out for it."
I'm not surprised they took the route they did, frankly legal action sounds like a reactive move made probably on advice from a third party when the company was faced by an aggressor who was clearly (as per your comment) hell bent on tarring them with about the worst possible brush for any organization these days…a stain that it fundamentally did not deserve: whatever this was (nothing mostly) it wasnt a leak. There was no risk of harm, no potential victims, nothing.
What would you do if approached by a journalist who had a tape of you engaged in conversation with a child at an airport, and as a result was accusing you of sexual assault on a minor? I expect this is not ballparks away what you've kindly done to KeepNet. 'Offering' an opportunity to make a statement is simply twisting the knife.
I don't want to live in a world where this is acceptable, let alone considered to be anything but the world sort of bottom feeding. Thankfully I don't, even the most unsavoury news outlets didn't pick this up and run with it, and for good reason.
Like so many sadistic Facebook trolls before you, you've managed to create a little bubble filled with equally damaged people telling you that what you're doing is okay, normal even.
I'll leave this blog alone now, I've said my bit. I really don't have anything to do with KeepNet, they're probably all complete bastards but they didn't deserve to be targeted by an opportunist with no qualms about causing irreparable damage all based off a false premise maliciously arrived at and backed up by a sort of DDoS from goons on Twitter. At least with blackmail and extortion you get a choice, with Graham Cluely you just get shafted.
I bet this comes back to bite you. Most people won't bother becoming outraged and feeling compelled to comment like me, they will just pop a little red dot next to the name Cluely in thick, permanent pen, reflect for a minute on the long way the google news algorithm has still to go and continue with their day.
> Even the most unsavoury news outlets didn't pick this up and
> run with it, and for good reason.
I know you've decided to leave this blog now, and probably won't read this. But please allow me to interject for a second, with a minor correction.
The news was initially covered by several security news outlets which initially mentioned Keepnet Labs and then – presumably having received similar pressure to that I received from the company – removed their name from their articles.
These include, but are not limited to Security Affairs, IAPP, SC Magazine, CISO Magazine, and HackRead. Security Week also reported the story and has still not – to my knowledge – removed Keepnet's name. None of these articles mentioned me, and indeed some of them were probably written before my article. So I can’t claim any credit for what they wrote.
In addition, The Register and Verdict have written articles about Keepnet's poor handling of the aftermath of the security breach, and how they attempted to wipe their name off the articles written about the breach.
As far as I can tell I was targeted by Keepnet Labs’s lawyers because I kept asking them for an explanation as to what happened, rather than just removing their name without question. They did not want to give an explanation of what happened, or offer any kind of statement that I could publish.
I’ll leave it to readers to decide for themselves why they were reluctant to give an explanation of what happened – it certainly seems very odd to me.
I do think if Keepnet Labs had simply been transparent and explained what happened in the first place, there wouldn’t have been all this kerfuffle.
As for the other points in your article, I’ll leave it to others to respond to if they wish… as I could be accused of being biased in my opinion of the author. :)
I'm with Graham