

ICSG – Driving Security Standards , Practices and Industry Co-operation

Vincent Weafer, Symantec
Igor Muttik, McAfee

Industry Connections Security Group

20th July 2009




Agenda

- The problem
- Re-inventing the wheel?
- Introducing ICSG
- Malware Working Group
- XML format
- Main concepts
- Details
- Questions



The Problem

- Attackers have shifted away from mass distribution of a small number of threats to micro distribution of millions of distinct threats
- The security industry still by and large responds to threats in their individual silo's with 'limited' operational & cross industry co-operation
- The bad actors have been able to leverage the underground economy to gain economies of scale as well as access to specialist tools and services
- Many in the security industry want to pool their experience and resources in response to this systematic and rapid rise in new malware



Re-Inventing the Wheel ?

- ▣ Lots of great examples of working groups focused on specific aspects of security intelligence , incident response, testing, best practices & policies





- ❖ APWG *Anti-Phishing Intelligence & Best Practices*
- ❖ ASC *Anti-Spyware Intelligence and Best Practices*
- ❖ AMTSO *Anti-Malware Testing Standards and Best Practices*
- ❖ CARO *Computer Anti-Virus Research Organization*
- ❖ Others *AVAR, EICAR, AVPD, MWAAG , FIRST etc*




Re-Inventing the Wheel ?

- Lots of great examples of working groups focused on specific aspects of security intelligence , incident response, testing, best practices & policies

*However, this co-operation typically has not been **standardized** or **documented** in a format that lends itself to **systematic improvement** in operational efficiency, or **visibility and review** by people **outside the vertical industries** and in many cases that was **not their mandate***



Introducing



ICSG


Industry Connections Security Group

ICSG Goal & Structure

- Established under the umbrella of the the IEEE-SA Standards Association
- Facilitate the pooling of industry experience and resources
- Act as a forum for discussions related to the sharing of security protection information and development of proposed standards and best practices
- Membership in ICSG is entity based e.g. corporation, academic institutions, consultancy
- Current executive committee comprised of AVG, McAfee, Microsoft, Sophos, Symantec, Trend Micro, but open to others
- *Goes beyond Malware Issues !*

Why the IEEE?

- Need to reach outside the traditional groups to pool as many different contributors as possible.
- IEEE is a recognized brand known to deliver standards
- The existing infrastructure of the IEEE allowed us to start working on the crux of the issues, instead of wasting time on the org side.
- We leverage the brand to attract the non-traditional players into the pool.




What to focus on ?



How do we improve the efficiency of the collection & processing of the millions of malware file samples we all handle each and every month ?

How it works



We add available metadata to file sample during transfer (XML format)

The Benefit

- AV vendors
 - Ability to prioritize sample processing
 - Faster reaction to important threats
 - By their commonality in the field
 - By the “first seen” timestamp
 - Reduces the duplication of samples
- AV testers
 - Helps rank threats
 - Age threats out
 - Run proper “proactive” tests
- Researchers
 - Linking what was hard to link before (e.g. IP ranges, URLs, malware)
 - Persistent knowledgebase in common format
 - More knowledge – more power




Malware Working Group


- Focused on development of a XML based metadata sharing standard to augment the current industry malware sample sharing process
- Website & Wiki located at <http://ieee.sanasecurity.com>
- Home for the schema for validation purposes
<http://ieee.sanasecurity.com/schema/1.0/metadataSharing.xsd>

Additional Contributors

*Support Intelligence
Immunent
Team Cymru
ShadowServer
Arbor Networks
Cisco
WebSense
AV-Test
SonicWall
Avira
and many others..*



Development Phases



Key Milestones

Deliverables	Date
Malware Meta-Data Exchange Format (MMDEF) V1 XML Schema document ready for Beta testing by initial WG Participants	9 th April 2009
Final XML Review Meeting by initial WG Participants	17 th April 2009
MMDEF V1 XML Schema document (draft) complete and ready for review with Invitees	22 nd April 2009
MMDEF V1 Review 1	1 st May 2009
MMDEF V1 Review 2	8 th May 2009
MMDEF V1 Review 3	15 th May 2009
MMDEF V1 Review 4	22 nd May 2009
MMDEF V1 XML Schema document (final) complete and sent for informal WG ballot of readiness for piloting	29 th May 2009
Approval of MMDEF V1 XML Schema document for piloting	17 th June 2009
Piloting of Schema begins	18 th June 2009
TargetPiloting concludes	31 st July 2009
MMDEF V1.1 Schema final edits and review complete (if needed)	August 2009
MMDEF V1.1 Schema balloted	Late August 2009

- The next section of the presentation gives a brief outline of the XML schema

How?

- Outgoing XMLs
 - Along with collection distribution (daily or ad-hoc)
 - RAR-archived (for integrity checking)
 - PGP-encrypted (for authenticated access)
 - Distributed via FTP/SFTP/HTTP/HTTPS
(same as already used for collection distribution)

- Incoming XMLs will likely be routed into a DB
 - Level of details will depend on the source
 - At least two companies already started distribution

XML format

- Why XML
 - All is likely to be database-driven – XML is friendly for RDBMS
 - Friendly for humans too
 - Extendable
 - Common and supported everywhere

Main concepts (1)

- Header
 - Source of meta-data
 - Author
 - Timestamp

- Object1..ObjectNN
 - File
 - URI, domain, service (protocol:port)
 - Environment
 - Registry
 - Entity

- Classification1.. ClassificationMM
 - Clean/dirty/unwanted
 - Malware category
 - Detection name, product, company

Main concepts (2)

- Relationships1.. RelationshipsXX
 - Child
 - Parent
 - droppedBy, hosts, installed, runs, exploits, downloads, resolvesTo, verifiedBy, usesCNC, contactedBy, operatedByEntity, isnameServerOf, causesToInstall, ...

- fieldData1..fieldDataYY
 - firstSeen
 - Origin (e.g. country/collection/honeypot/...)
 - Commonality, priority

- Reference - file[@id="12345"].

Example (minimal)

```

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<malwareMetaData xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
  xsi:schemaLocation="http://xml/metadataSharing.xsd metadataSharing.xsd"
  xmlns="http://xml/metadataSharing.xsd" version="1.0" id="1234">
  <company>McAfee</company>
  <author>Raider</author>
  <comment>This is minimal - just some files</comment>
  <timeStamp>2008-11-25T21:34:56</timeStamp>
  <objects>
    <!-- files -->
    <file id="2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599">
      <!--<attribute type="filename">116.exe</attribute-->
      <md5>8b31da6402d850ce94e7c19bc97effe1</md5>
      <sha1>850e5b037c799f86f04ee63da786f9ee139ebf57</sha1>
      <sha256>2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599</sha256>
      <size>32769</size>
      <crc32>34efdbca</crc32>
    </file>
    <file id="3a437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599">
      <!--<attribute type="filename">116.exe</attribute-->
      <md5>aa31da6402d850ce94e7c19bc97effe1</md5>
      <sha1>990e5b037c799f86f04ee63da786f9ee139ebf57</sha1>
      <sha256>22437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599</sha256>
    </file>
  </objects>
</malwareMetaData>

```

Example (file+ref+classification)

```

<objects>
  <!-- one file -->
  <file id="2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599">
    <!--<attribute type= filename >i16.exe</attribute-->
    <md5>8b31da6402d850ce94e7c19bc97effe1</md5>
    <sha1>850e5b037c799f86f04ee63da786f9ee139ebf57</sha1>
    <sha256>2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599</sha256>
    <size>32768</size>
  </file>

  <!-- one classification -->
  <classification id="AVG:Virut.BK" type="dirty">
    <classificationName>Virut.BK</classificationName>
    <companyName>AVG</companyName>
  </classification>
</objects>

<!-- this file is Virut -->
<relationships>
  <relationship type="isClassifiedAs">
    <parents>
      <ref>file[@id = '2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599']</ref>
    </parents>
    <children>
      <ref>classification[@id='AVG:Virut.BK']</ref>
    </children>
  </relationship>
</relationships>

```

Example (field data)

```

<!-- this is the prevalence data -->
<fieldData>
  <!-- by file -->
  <fieldDataEntry>
    <references>
      <ref>file[@id = '2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599']</ref>
    </references>
    <startDate>-1999-11-25T00:00:00</startDate>
    <endDate>2008-11-26T00:00:00 </endDate>
    <origin>user</origin>
    <commonality>8</commonality>
    <location type="countryCodeISO3166-2">US</location>
  </fieldDataEntry>
  <fieldDataEntry>
    <references>
      <ref>file[@id = '2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599']</ref>
    </references>
    <startDate>2008-11-26T00:00:00</startDate>
    <endDate>2008-11-27T00:00:00</endDate>
    <origin>user</origin>
    <commonality>5</commonality>
    <location type="countryCodeISO3166-2">US</location>
  </fieldDataEntry>
  <fieldDataEntry>
    <references>
      <ref>file[@id = '2f437c1c8f73c2d6ffbb6214d3f1ccfe994151b3bd80fe2b3934a1bc89384599']</ref>
    </references>
    <startDate>2008-11-27T00:00:00</startDate>
    <endDate>2008-11-28T00:00:00</endDate>
    <origin>user</origin>
    <commonality>1</commonality>
  </fieldDataEntry>

```

Next Steps

- We're looking for active members of the Malware Working Group
- We need more participants in the pilot
- We need ideas on critical areas we should focus on
 - Ideas so far include blacklisting of malicious & predominately malicious packers/obfuscators .

Questions

